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remember or commemorate the events of the Japanese Occupation in their nation-building efforts of using history to support nationalist goals.
It is worthwhile examining why different South East Asian countries fall into either the group that has a national day for remembering its nation's wartime experiences, or the other group that forgets, at least at a national level. This would entail making comparisons of the consequences that commemorating the events of the Japanese Occupation have for nation-building. Perhaps not remembering the Japanese Occupation is viewed by some countries in the region as furthering nation-building rather than remembering a time of wartime divisiveness or a period of history that may overshadow other events deemed more important for national history? The first step is to outline how war memory has been used in countries that nationally commemorate the experience of the Japanese Occupation, that is, in Singapore, the Philippines and Burma. The second step entails examining how nationbuilding in other South East Asian countries has meant not commemorating the Japanese Occupation at a national level.
Singapore
In South East Asian history, the crucial date that marks the Japanese Occupation and the beginning of the end of empire in the region is that of the fall of Singapore. In Singapore, 15 February 1942, marking the date of the surrender of Singapore, has since 1998 been designated Total Defence Day. While not a national holiday, the day is marked in all Singapore schools as a time to remember national suffering during the Japanese Occupation through drawing lessons from historical storytelling and re-enactments. In some schools, young cadet soldiers with a theatrical bent are hired to act as Japanese soldiers to take schoolchildren prisoner, then shout at them and order the pupils around. At one secondary school in 1999, this was so realistic that some children had to be taken to hospital and others were traumatized. 7 At other schools, students go hungry or are served minute amounts of the basic foods available during the Japanese Occupation, such as tapioca, to remind them of the hardships of their great-grandparents. 8 The lessons found in Singapore's history and social studies textbooks teach schoolchildren that the Japanese Occupation demonstrates that 7 Straits Times (Singapore), 2 March 1999. 8 Straits Times (Singapore), 15 February 2003. 8 South East Asia Research they must prepare themselves to defend the country against any future invasion, which could bring about similar suffering. This is because modern Singapore is a country in which all males, on reaching the age of 18, must commence over two years of National Service, and then continue with regular military training. To deter any potential future enemy, Singapore claims that it can bring 300,000 well trained men under arms in 24 hours. The social studies textbook for secondary schools used since 1994 explicitly makes a connection between the failure of the British in defending the people of Singapore from the Japanese in 1942 and the need for National Service and military training in contemporary Singapore. The textbook says that, 'from the British defeat we learn' that 'a country must always be well-prepared for any attacks from enemies' and that 'it must not depend on others to protect its people'. The textbook goes on to draw the lesson from life during the Japanese Occupation as being that 'the people must be trained to defend their own country'. Thus, 'in 1967, the government started National Service' in order 'to enable all young men to be trained to defend Singapore in case of war'. 9 Clearly, commemorating the Japanese Occupation is used to ready the schoolchildren to make their commitment to the defence of the nation.
On the morning of 15 February in Singapore at the four 64.7 metre tall pillars of the Civilian War Memorial built in 1967 in the heart of Singapore's civic district, representatives of Singapore's different ethnic communities -Chinese, Malays, Indians and Eurasians -as well as hundreds of schoolchildren, veterans, representatives of the armed forces, plus a cabinet minister representing the Singapore government, gather for a wreath-laying ceremony. Each pillar of the Civilian War Memorial symbolizes one of the four main ethnic groups; and these pillars merge into the base of the monument representing the overall nation. 10 In recent years, the ceremony has been started by the 'All Clear' siren that would be used if Singapore were to be attacked. It is closed by prayers said by leaders of Singapore's Inter-Religious Council representing the Muslim, Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Sikh and Zoroastrian faiths, one minute of silence and the playing of the last 9 Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore (1994) 'This piece of concrete commemorates an experience which in spite of its horrors, served as a catalyst in building a nation out of the young and unestablished community of diverse immigrants. We suffered together. It told us that we share a common destiny. And it is through sharing such common experiences that the feeling of living and being one community is established.'
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The historian Diana Wong has observed that in contemporary Singapore, commemoration of the Japanese Occupation has reinforced what she sees as the Singapore government's 'survivalist' message: that for Singapore to survive as a small country with large and not necessarily friendly neighbours, its citizens must unite across its ethnic divisions to be vigilant, self-reliant and make sacrifices for the defence of their nation. 13 Indeed, on Total Defence Day, Singapore schoolchildren are told to remember the atrocities of the Second World War in order to understand more fully the Ministry of Education's National Education message of survival of the nation in terms of defence: 'We must ourselves defend Singapore'. The Singapore government explained when announcing the establishment of Total Defence Day that, 'the day in 1942 when Singapore fell to the Japanese' would 'serve as a reminder that everyone has a part to play in the country's defence'. 
The Philippines
Memory of the Japanese Occupation manifests itself in many facets of the popular culture of the Philippines. 15 This strong public memory of the Second World War is enshrined in the commemoration of 9 April as the national holiday known as the Day of Valour, or in Tagalog, Araw ng Kagitingan, marking the fall of Bataan in 1942. On this day, Filipino and American troops on the Bataan Peninsula surrendered to the Japanese, and then began the Bataan Death March of 62,100 Filipinos along with 9,921 Americans, of whom 5,000 to 10,000 Filipinos and 650 Americans died. 16 Many of these Filipinos later joined the anti-Japanese resistance after they were released. On 9 April every year, the President of the Philippines, or if he or she cannot attend, the Defence Secretary or Vice-President, leads a national ceremony remembering the suffering and sacrifices of the war veterans and the Philippine people under the Japanese Occupation. They lay a wreath at the Dambana ng Kagitingan, or Shrine of Valour colonnade complex, at the bottom of Mount Samat, Bataan. This building is overlooked by a huge 92 metre white concrete cross on top of the 553 metre mountain. The Dambana ng Kagitingan cross is so large that it has a lift inside, which visitors can take to a viewing platform at the arms of the cross. The commanders of the Philippines armed forces attend, as do the Japanese and American ambassadors. The President inspects the guard of honour from the Philippines military, then addresses a crowd of thousands, many of whom are Filipino Second World War veterans.
Addressing veterans at the 2006 ceremony, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001 to present) explained the significance of the Day of Valour to nation-building, 'As we commemorate the death march, we celebrate the valour of Filipinos to face adversities in the name of freedom and show our resilience in the face of difficulties that come our way'. Arroyo added, 'We have won many victories in our struggles, because we help one another and because we know how to sacrifice. The struggle is still long and heavy but we are determined to win…' Day confirm Theodore Friend's work on the impact of the war on the relationship between the Philippines and the USA. He argued that Japanese Occupation led to a post-war relationship in which there was little sign that the Philippines was seeking to assert its sovereignty. Instead the experience tied the Philippines more closely to the USA so that it willingly acquiesced to dependence upon American military power and economic dominance.
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What was forgotten in the early post-war remembering of Bataan Day was the collaboration between the Japanese and members of the Philippine elite. Friend in his research sees this as a mutual forgetting by both the Americans and the Filipinos. He points to General Douglas MacArthur's support for Roxas as an early post-war president of the Philippines, despite knowing that although Roxas was a member of the resistance, he also collaborated with the Japanese. 23 Very few Filipinos who were put on trial for collaboration were actually convicted before President Roxas declared a general amnesty in January 1948. 24 This joint American and Philippine mutual forgetting of collaboration is illustrated in President Magsaysay, a staunch wartime anti-Japanese fighter, sending Philippine Senator Jose P. Laurel, the wartime puppet president of the Japanese, to lead a mission to the USA to negotiate an economic agreement in 1955.
At the tenth anniversary of the fall of Bataan in 1952, there were joint national commemorations in the Philippines and in the USA, where Congress declared that 9 April should be marked nationwide as Bataan Day.
25 In Manila, Magsaysay, then Defence Secretary, gave the Bataan Day address on behalf of the President of the Philippines. He stressed that the sacrifices of Bataan had been made by American and Filipino soldiers for the 'ideals of democracy', which were still 'under attack in our land' in the form that 'calls itself communism', of which 'our own Huks are examples'. 26 Interestingly, he also told the rich landlords to practise the spirit of self-sacrifice shown at Bataan rather than the greed and exploitation that he saw as the root cause of the Huk peasant rebellion. This illustrates Tony Stockwell's point that in South East Asia, 
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'nation-building acquired added importance with the advent of the Cold War' as 'nation-states were erected as bunds against the surge of communism' and appeals to nationalism were used to check the expansion of international communism. 27 In 1954, Magsaysay, as President of the Philippines, made 9 April a national holiday so that the whole nation could mark the day. 28 A tradition was established in the early 1950s, whereby the President would declare Bataan Day a public holiday, until finally the Philippine Congress passed a resolution in 1960 making Bataan Day one of the official holidays.
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Magsaysay's successor President Carlos Garcia (1957-61), like Magsaysay himself, a war veteran and fighter in the anti-Japanese resistance, also gave speeches at Mount Samat that placed Bataan Day in the context of the Cold War. However, with the defeat of the Huk Rebellion, the call for self-sacrifice shifted from defending the nation to nation-building in other ways. In 1958, Garcia urged that newly erected memorials to 'the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor' must 'continue to fire the spirit of nationalism and strengthen unity among our people' and 'continue to prove to us that in nation-building, as in war, sectional and partisan bickerings and breast-beatings have no place. Above all, they must continue to inspire in us the highest order of national discipline and unqualified patriotism.' Garcia added, 'I must deeply emphasize this last consideration because I believe that if there was any time in our post-war history when the need for the highest order of national dedication and selflessness on our part is greatest, it is at this stage of our national life.' He was invoking the spirit of Bataan for exercising restraint in fixing the economy: 'The disturbed state of our economy needs the institution of remedial measures which would entail some degree of sacrifice on part of the people'. 30 Even Senator Estanislao Fernandez of the opposition Liberal Party, while disagreeing with Garcia and his Nacionalista Party on many elements of policy, could concur on the eve of Bataan Day in 1961 that the Filipino soldiers of Bataan 'have not sacrificed themselves in vain, as far as the task of nation building is concerned', as he gave examples of the reconstruction of the country after the war and its economic development. 
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It became common to call upon the spirit of Bataan Day to rally the nation around economic policies that would entail individual sacrifice so that the nation as a whole could advance economically. At the 20 th anniversary in 1962, President Diosdado Macapagal (1961-65) gave voice to his hope that the 'spirit that spurred Filipino soldiers to risk their lives' at the fall of Bataan would inspire the Filipino people in the 'great task of nation-building' so that the administration could pursue 'the quest for a better life for each and every Filipino citizen'.
32
Macapagal was the president who pushed through the Agricultural Land Reform Code that transformed many peasants from being tenants to landowners, although the reform displeased many landlords.
The malleability of what the memory of the Bataan and the Japanese Occupation could be used for reached absurd heights under President Ferdinand Marcos . His political career had been assisted by him fabricating his war record so that he appeared the most decorated Filipino war veteran. 33 He used Bataan Day to parade his 27 (mainly fake) war medals. Early in his administration, newspaper columnists, when there was still freedom of the press, would complain about how Marcos's cronies used the occasion for his self-glorification. 34 39 The change proved unpopular with veterans, who disliked the change of the traditional date. 40 After the fall of Marcos in February 1986, the now free Manila Times also rued 'incorporating the three events into Araw ng Kagitingan, with Marcos, of course as the self-styled hero of both Bataan and Besang Pass. It was the day of the year when Marcos paraded his fake medals. There is no reason why the country should perpetuate such a celebration.' The editor described changing the date back to 9 April as 'Erasing signs of a dictator'. 41 On 30 June 1987, President Corazon Aquino (1986-92) re-designated Araw ng Kagitingan as 9 April.
42
Araw ng Kagitingan survived Marcos's corruption of it. Commemoration of Filipino experiences during the Japanese Occupation was adapted to assimilate imagery of the mass protests and demonstrations known as 'people power' that had led to Marcos's fall. Speaking at the first post-Marcos Araw ng Kagitingan at Mount Samat in 1986, VicePresident Salvador Laurel declared that in commemorating Bataan, 'we commemorate the birth of a national commitment to peace that comprises the coercive force behind people power'. 43 In the following years In the Philippines, thus, we see that the national day for commemoration of the Japanese Occupation has for over 60 years been used to 44 Manila Chronicle, 9 April 1988. 
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extol democratic ideals in its role as an agent for nation-buildingwith the exception of the Marcos dictatorship. Then, it was used for what Tarling has called regime-building, in conjunction with nationbuilding. 49 For a South East Asian contrast in how commemoration of the war has been used for nation-building, Burma provides an interesting foil to the Philippines. In Burma, commemoration of wartime resistance against the Japanese has also been used for nation-building. However, such commemoration has clearly not been for the pursuit of democratic ideals, as in the Philippines, but for strengthening the military and its regime.
Burma
In Burma, 27 March is the national holiday known as Armed Forces Day, marking the day in 1945 on which the Burma National Army under Aung San began armed resistance against the Japanese forces occupying the country. On 27 March at Naypyidaw, Burma's new capital city, the parade of soldiers is meant to remind the ethnically diverse people of the nation of what the military sees as its great achievements. These are: the role the military played in resisting the Japanese, in what is described as an anti-fascist struggle, gaining independence from the British, and keeping the country together in almost continuous struggle against separatist movements since the end of the Second World War. Robert H. Taylor argues, 'The date 27 March, now Army Day, is perceived as the symbolic beginning of modern Myanmar when the army seized its destiny to forge an independent state despite the odds and despite the enemies which surrounded it. The Myanmar national story has become conflated with the story of its army.' 50 On 27 March, the military assembles in the large open public square at Naypyidaw below three giant statues of Burma's most powerful warrior kings. These are Anawrahta (reigned 1044-77, and who was the first king to unite Burma politically), Bayinnaung (reigned 1551-81, a warrior king who restored Burma's political boundaries and conquered the Shan states while extending Burma's northern borders with China) and Alaungpaya (reigned 1752-60, another warrior king who subjugated the Mons This conflation of nationalism and the military on Armed Forces Day has a history going back decades. The names of these three great Burmese kings portrayed in sculpture at Naypyidaw, as well as others from Burmese history, are the very names of the key columns of the armed forces that converge on the square from different points. Another column for Armed Forces Day is named after Hsinphyushin (reigned 1763-76) who, just as Bayinnaung had done in the sixteenth century, sacked the Thai capital of Ayudhaya. There is also a column named after Kyanzittha (reigned 1084-1113), who consolidated the territorial gains of his father Anawrahta's unification of Burma and entered into partnership with the Mons. 52 For decades, the military forces have paraded in columns named after their ancient conquering kings every 27 March.
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Before the capital was moved from Rangoon (Yangon) in 2006, the main ceremony was held at Resistance Park, and the columns would converge on it from all parts of the city. Resistance Park was the location from where Aung San, as commander, rallied the Burma National Army on 17 March 1945 to attack the Japanese Imperial Army at various locations on 27 March 1945. As the troops left, they were showered by well-wishers with sprigs of eugenia leaves, signifying victory. This has been re-enacted every Armed Forces Day. role of the army. 54 The propaganda of the military has tended to indicate that the name change was made by Ne Win in 1955, expressing it as 'when the need arose for the Tatmadaw to choose a day to be designated as the "Armed Forces Day", it chose the Anti-Fascist Resistance Day'. 55 In 1954, according to the military junta of Burma's propaganda sheets, the armed forces under Ne Win staked their claim for ownership of 27 March when they had staged their first elaborate military parade ceremony for the commemoration of the day. 56 This was a spectacular ceremony exactly re-enacting Aung San's rally of the Burma National Army at Resistance Park on 17 March 1945. Aung San's eight columns of soldiers that marched out of the park were shown as eight rays of light moving across a giant illuminated map of Burma, indicating where they were going to take up their positions against the Japanese.
57
In the 1950s, the military under Ne Win increasingly sought to appropriate 27 March as Armed Forces Day: a process not completed until they had full power in the 1960s. Previously, Resistance Day commemorations had not emphasized the armed forces, but the political party that started the resistance to the Japanese -the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL). The leader of the AFPFL, Prime Minister U Nu, or a senior member of the government, would usually give the key Resistance Day address and start by emphasizing the role of the party. In 1951, he told the national mass rally on 27 March: 'As you all are aware, the AFPFL was formed with the primary purpose of acting as the vanguard of the people against the Japanese imperialists. Indeed that resistance against the Japanese under the leadership of AFPFL had been successful. When the resistance against the Japanese was over the onus of offering resistance again fell on AFPFL which successfully discharged its duty. As a result of that success, AFPFL was able to regain independence -which had been Since the 1950s, there has been an annual Armed Forces Exhibition telling this same story of the military as the builder and protector of the nation from ancient times to the colonial period, into the Japanese Occupation, through the struggle for independence and the fight against the insurgents. The annual exhibition's importance was often highlighted by Ne Win's (or another high-ranking military officer's) visits to its opening. These visits would invariably be reported on the front page of the controlled press. 62
In the crushing of the pro-democracy movement after 1988, the military used their version of the past with the armed forces as the key historical movement in Burmese history to legitimize their actions. On Armed Forces Day 1989, General Saw Maung, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, linked the actions of the military in crushing democracy to being in accord with preserving Burma's unity stretching back to ancient times: 'Our motherland which Anawrahta, Kyanzittha, Bayinnaung, Alaungpaya, and Hsinphyushin, and Bogyoke Aung San had built up, nurtured, and consolidated through the ages, cannot be allowed to be in disorder and to disintegrate during our time'.
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On the landmark fiftieth anniversary of Armed Forces Day in 1995, the message from General Than Shwe, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, focused on the Japanese Occupation, but once again played up the role of the military in nation-building: 'From the time it launched the Anti-fascist Resistance the Tatmadaw attained the status of a national army that represents the nation and all the national people'. His speech exemplified how the military had appropriated Resistance Day to show that it had created the modern nation: 'On 27 March 1945, our Tatmadaw made its own decision and legitimately declared war and launched the Resistance. Therefore, this day was designated Armed Forces Day because it was the day attributes of a national army were attained and the Anti-fascist Resistance was launched.' 64 General Shwe in his Armed Forces Day addresses has continued to stress the legitimacy of the military's power as lying in its revolt against the Japanese when the army commenced its self-proclaimed role of being at the vanguard of the modern Burmese nationalist movement. He regularly outlined the history of the Tatmadaw under the Japanese, and how the Japanese were initially supportive of an independent army set up by the nationalist movement in Burma, but later switched to 22 South East Asia Research wanting to reduce it in size and change its name. 65 He would end by saying 'that our Tatmadaw was able to transform itself from an organization under the influence of others [the Japanese] into the National Tatmadaw'. 66 Thus, in Burma, the military junta uses -for both regime-building and nation-building -the conception of the armed forces being a people's nationalist liberation movement formed during the Japanese Occupation to free Burma from the Japanese and the British. In the ruling junta's version of the wartime past, the military's role is that of a nationalist vanguard, always at the centre of Burma's modern history. The regime effectively commemorates the events surrounding 27 March 1945 to uphold its perception of the military as both the creator and protector of the modern Burmese nation. Burma's use of 27 March 1945 is similar to Singapore's use of 15 February 1942 in terms of war memory being used to bolster the importance of defence and military preparedness in their different societies. This contrasts starkly with the Philippines, where war memory has also been regularly used for nation-building, but has equally often been used to reaffirm the nation's commitment to democratic ideals, which are viewed as integral to Philippine nationalism.
A national amnesia about the war in most South East Asian countries?
In Singapore, the Philippines and Burma, the memory of selected events of the Japanese Occupation is marked on a national day each year as part of a public commemoration or remembering of a collective past aimed at nation-building. However, in other countries of South East Asia, similar national days that have arisen out of the memory of the Second World War are absent. This is the case in Indonesia and Vietnam, even though their national independence days, respectively marked on 17 August 1945 and 2 September 1945, were soon after the surrender of the Japanese. There has been little effort on the part of the Vietnamese and Indonesian states to evoke the memory of the Japanese Occupation and the war on these days, as compared with the commemorations of Singapore, the Philippines and Burma. Examining this 'national amnesia' of the Japanese Occupation might suggest some 
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paths to explore in the relationship between war memory and nationbuilding.
Anthony Reid, in his study of the lack of commemoration of the Japanese Occupation in Indonesia, suggests some explanations. He noted that despite there being hundreds of thousands of Indonesians who were romusha, or forced labour, under the Japanese, many of whom died on the Burma-Thailand Railway, and others who were 'comfort women' or sexual slaves to the Japanese, 'the major institutions are not much interested' in marking their suffering. He indicated that the process of creating a shared past in nation-building in Indonesia had meant that there was no national remembering of the Japanese Occupation. 'Overlaying private and family memories of the war, and increasingly replacing them in the consciousness of the youth is the official history', writes Reid.
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In Singapore, the Philippines and Burma, remembering the events of the Japanese Occupation is essential in creating a common collective memory for nation-building. However, in Indonesia, nation-building dictates that the Japanese Occupation is downplayed so that history conveys Indonesian nationalism more strongly. The Japanese Occupation does not loom large in collective memory of the past 'because of the overwhelming accent laid on the subsequent revolutionary period in which Indonesians themselves play the leading part', Peter Post and Elly Touwen-Bouwsma write.
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While 17 August 1945 was taken as the 'central date of the nation', in the Sukarno period from 1946 to 1967, Reid continues, 'official history was explicitly revolutionary, negating the pre-1945 past except as prelude to revolution, and pointing to an elusive messianic future'. He goes on to argue that in the Suharto period (1967-98), official national history 'placed the Indonesian Army and Suharto himself at the centre of national history; and it subordinated all other dates to those of revolutionary struggle -especially 17 August 1945'. Reid concluded that in the public remembering of Indonesia's past, 'The Japanese Occupation was an important prelude to that event, but to commemorate its portentous happenings as turning points in their own right would risk diluting the transcendent quality of 1945, and giving the Japanese a share in the glory that belongs to Indonesians themselves in asserting their independence'. 69 Demonstrating an awareness of this point, Sukarno 67
Reid, supra note 6, at pp 172-173.
Peter Post and Elly Touwen-Bouwsma (1997), Japan, Indonesia and the War, KITLV, Leiden, p 5.
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Reid, supra note 6, at pp 172-174. Sukarno's anger was specifically in response to the publication in the 1950s of the memoirs of former high-ranking Japanese military officials in Indonesia, Nishijama Shigetada, Miyoshi Skunkichiro and Admiral Maeda Tadashi. They claimed to have contributed to the writing of the independence declaration while Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta were at Admiral Maeda's official residence before its announcement. 71 However, Sukarno's 1959 national day address more generally illustrated the prevailing desire to forget collaboration with the Japanese to achieve independence. The Japanese had assisted in broadcasting Sukarno's nationalist speeches across Indonesia. Sukarno was made head of a Japanese-sponsored commission to create a constitution for an independent Indonesia. They also raised a volunteer army, Peta [Pembela Tanah Air, Defenders of the Fatherland], which later became the army with which the Indonesian nationalists fought the Dutch. The Japanese education system helped foster thousands of pemuda, or politically aware youths, who were determined to fight for independence. In return for Japanese help, Sukarno assisted them in recruiting forced labourers, who later died in their thousands from Japanese ill-treatment on war projects such as the Burma-Thailand Railway. 72 Thus, remembering these complex events of the Japanese Occupation rather than focusing on completing the goals of the Indonesian nationalist struggle that followed after 1945 was obviously not conducive to fostering nation-building.
Examining commemorations of 17 August 1945 bears out the conclusions of Reid, Post and Touwen-Bouwsma. In the early celebrations, Sukarno's speeches often outlined how independence and the Indonesian Revolution constituted an uncompleted project that had to be realized by looking towards the future rather than the past. 73 Revolution had not been completed by gaining full sovereignty in 1949, but was 'still far from being ended'. 74 While viewing the independence exhibition the day before his speech, he indicated that 'now we feel capable to complete our revolution,' adding that 'our struggle was devoted to the destruction of the colonial remnants but now to the national construction'. 75 In his last 17 August address in 1966, called 'Never leave history', Sukarno talked of the ongoing project of building 'the unity of consciousness to complete our Revolution, our REVOLUTION. Once again our REVOLUTION, which is not completed yet.' 76 When the army under General Suharto took charge of Indonesia after 1966, 17 August was still not used to invoke the wartime past or the history that gave birth to the proclamation and the 1945 constitution. Suharto never outlined the circumstances of the Japanese Occupation that gave rise to these objects of nation-building. Indeed, it was not until 1985 that Suharto even mentioned Sukarno at all in his proclamation day address, and that was in a brief sentence indicating Sukarno and Hatta's authorship of the proclamation of 17 August 1945. 77 On the fiftieth anniversary, Suharto reiterated the idea of looking to the future in pursuing economic progress rather than back to the past: 'We see development as a continuation of the struggle we waged during the periods of the War for independence and revolution'.
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In the post-Suharto period too, there has been less focus on commemorating the past and a greater emphasis on the future development of the country. The 17 August addresses of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004 to present) and his post-Suharto predecessors have been similar to those of the Suharto period. Sukarno's rhetoric of an unending revolution coming out of Indonesia's history has been replaced with the administration recounting what it has done and its hopes for the future. The Jakarta Post wrote in its editorial of the 2007 address, 'From beginning to end, the speech was little more than a list of what the President claimed to be the achievements of his administration. The rest was a to-do list for the country. ' 79 There has been little evocation of history in the speeches, and the circumstances of the Japanese Occupation seem even further away from the commemorations than ever before. In many respects, marking 17 August does seem to mean forgetting the significance and complexity of the Japanese Occupation that brought about the proclamation of independence.
In Vietnam, which proclaimed its independence on 2 September 1945, just a few weeks after the surrender of Japan on 15 August 1945, a similar amnesia -or more specifically a selective remembering -has existed for what seem to be similar reasons. The events of the Communist Party coming to power in the 'August Revolution' of 1945 feature more significantly in commemoration of the Vietnamese proclamation of independence than do similar events in Indonesian celebrations of its own proclamation. Still, remembering the struggle for independence flowing from the 'August Revolution' has tended to be viewed as more suitable for nation-building than for recalling the suffering of horrendous famine and other hardships, as well as the various contesting nationalist groups of the Japanese Occupation, of which the Communist Party was just one. The revolution was still an uncompleted project that would not end until South Vietnam fell on 30 May 1975.
In 1965, on the twentieth anniversary of the 2 September declaration of independence by Ho Chi Minh, North Vietnam's Premier Pham Van Dong (1955-87) gave the key national address. However, he did not commemorate the circumstances of the Japanese Occupation that produced the proclamation of independence, but used the occasion to look to the future. Pham Van Dong urged the nation to look back 'at the victorious path they have trodden over the past twenty years, close their ranks, heighten still further their will to fight against US aggression' to continue 'the revolutionary struggle' to bring about a unified Vietnam. According to Pham Van Dong, they were still engaged in a revolutionary war, which had commenced at Ho Chi Minh's 1945 declaration and would be waged until South Vietnam was unified with the North. Pham Van Dong told the Vietnamese people: 'The proclamation of independence, and the words of President Ho Chi Minh, the founder of the New Vietnam, turned every Vietnamese patriot into a staunch fighter and to win victory for the revolutionary cause of the entire people, for the interests of the people and the glory of the fatherland'. ese Occupation that had produced the 1945 proclamation, but to remember simply the Communist Party as the vanguard of national liberation from 1945 onwards. David Marr has noted that the 'August Revolution' that brought the communists to power after the Japanese surrender in 1945 is often portrayed in official Vietnamese history as orchestrated by the Communist Party. In many official accounts, the Communist Party seems to get the 'credit for everything'. 81 However, he argues that it occurred more spontaneously as a result of complex causes that lay in the historical context of the Japanese Occupation. 82 Admitting this complexity of the events of 1945 is similar to delving into the Japanese Occupation for Indonesia. It takes the focus off the Communist Party and its revolutionary role. Tran My-Van has noted that remembering the Japanese Occupation in Vietnamese history brings up rival nationalist groups that could have claimed to be leading the country to independence, but were suppressed by the Communist Party. 83 Remembering the events of the Japanese Occupation has seldom been a feature of addresses and celebrations of 2 September since the unification of Vietnam in 1975. The national address given on 2 September has largely proclaimed a brighter future, as in Indonesia, or has used history to focus on the future. In his 1975 national day address, Pham Van Dong extolled the years that waited ahead of Vietnam, declaring that only now was the nation unified: 'For us Vietnamese, a glorious chapter of history has been turned and a new period begun: the period of peaceful construction'. However, he still believed that there was an ongoing revolution: 'this revolutionary process is continuing'. had struggled continuously throughout 30 years, carried out two wars of resistance…to regain independence'. 85 In 2005, when giving the National Day address, President Tran Duc Luong spoke of the 'August Revolution' having 'put an end to feudalism' and 'ushered in a new era' in which 'the working people are the masters of their country'. 86 Other South East Asian countries such as Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia and Brunei have no day at all on which the war can be recalled, despite the event being a significant one in their histories. Among these countries, Malaysia offers an interesting contrast to examine why there is a national amnesia about the Japanese Occupation for reasons other than those for Indonesia and Vietnam. According to Cheah Boon Kheng, in Malaysia there has been an official forgetting of the Japanese Occupation because of the divisiveness of the period for the major ethnic groups of Malaysia, the Chinese, Malays and Indians. 87 In Malaysia, there was a small but influential number of Malays from the Kesatuan Melayu Muda [Union of Malay Youth] nationalist political party collaborating with the Japanese in the hope of obtaining independence. In contrast, the Chinese of Malaysia were massacred in large numbers by the Japanese because they were seen as supporting the anti-Japanese movement in China. Thus, anti-Japanese guerrilla forces, known as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), became predominantly Chinese. The MPAJA was led by the Chinese communists, as they were the most organized of the resistance, and the group that the Japanese military could not tolerate at all. As in Indonesia, the Japanese sought to raise volunteer armies, which were drawn mainly from the Malays, and these were used by the Japanese against the mainly Chinese guerrillas. The Indians sought no common cause with the other ethnic groups. Instead, they raised the Indian National Army under the nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose, which aimed to liberate India by force with Japanese assistance. The result of this wartime ethnic division was an orgy of communal violence soon after the Japanese surrendered, particularly between the Malays and Chinese.
various governments and regimes, the nation-states of the region will ignore this crucial watershed in the history of South East Asia. The most notable of the countries that do not mark the Japanese Occupation, even though their independence days in 1945 were products of the forces unleashed during the Japanese Occupation, are Indonesia and Vietnam. Their 1945 independence dates have been evoked as the beginning of their national revolutions. The Japanese Occupation has been downplayed so as not to overshadow these national revolutions. However, the argument can also be put the other way: Singapore, the Philippines and Burma mark the Japanese Occupation because they did not declare independence at the time. In Malaysia, too, the Japanese Occupation works against nation-building, not because it might overshadow a declaration of independence, but because of its divisiveness in public memory.
